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## CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNION

We present the first English issue of the *West-Slavonic Bulletin*, which has been published in London in western Slavonic languages for two years. Our aim is to acquaint the public opinion of our English-speaking Allies with the plans for a new Central Europe visualised by the younger generation of the Central European nations.

The sharing of such information is vitally necessary to-day, as it will be to-morrow, and for a long time to come. The time of unilateral guarantees between free nations is over. If these nations are to win the war and then peace for a hundred, not twenty years, they should keep their solidarity and form a common insurance pool to which each nation should contribute a large proportion of its resources and forces.

This new Covenant, on which we propose to base the safety and prosperity in our part of Europe, cannot be made without a preliminary frank exchange of views between all nations, and in particular those which may have an important part to play in the working of the new system. It seems likely that the Central European nations, owing to their geographical position, may have to carry out some of the more onerous duties involved by the Covenant.

The public opinion of the countries concerned should consent to the broad principles of the Covenant before any further action is taken. This is a vital condition for any lasting and permanent agreement between democratic nations.

It is true that the Roosevelt-Churchill Atlantic Charter has been welcomed by the public opinion of both countries and of the other free nations, but the methods and means whereby its principles are to be put into practice are still by no means clear to all. A great deal of preliminary work has still to be done.

The future new order, based on the Covenant of Nations, can be efficiently organised only by a limited number of great powers which, irrespective of certain differences of structure and character, would deal with each other as equals. It is therefore clear that if the Central European nations propose to participate actively in the new order, they can do so only by joining it as a Union with 115 millions of

inhabitants. Only then can they be an asset instead of a liability in the world organisation of peace.

The healthy peasant peoples of Central Europe, capable of building up remarkable united strength, are all fanatically devoted to their freedom.

This newspaper will follow and report the struggles and the compromises between the rival ideas of selfish nationalism as opposed to those of constructive nationalism and of broad co-operation, as well as the evolution of different national ideas towards a greater, super-national solidarity of purpose.

The ideas which we intend to propagate are not the outcome of easy-chair meditations or academic discussions. They have been born in the minds of men who saw the disaster and humiliation of their countries, sometimes the death of their nearest; men who escaped across rivers, mountains and Gestapo-guarded frontiers to carry on the fight for freedom in France and then in Great Britain.

The observation of the collaboration of many nations within the British Commonwealth of Nations contributed to the formation of these ideas. Our plan is the result of a cross between the experience of peasant continental civilisations and the practice of the greatest maritime civilisation of the world.

These plans and ideas are still at an early stage of formation, in their birth throes. Every success or reverse of the Allied forces, every change in their moral and material war potential has an immediate effect on the intensity of our action. Nevertheless the conviction is growing that 115 million people, even disarmed and oppressed, are still a force that can turn the scales—especially as it is situated in the middle of the battle area—in a conflict in which the forces of the opponents seem approximately equal. It is at any rate a force that any of the belligerents would overlook or neglect at their own peril.

We realise, however, that we can play a historical part only by uniting our forces, which have been hitherto cancelling each other out. Our unity can be based on a great vision of security, freedom and prosperity for all the nations living



# OUR PATRIOTISM

by Dr. T. SULIMIRSKI, (Professor of Cracow University).

National consciousness is particularly strong to-day and no one planning the future of the world, particularly Europe, can afford to ignore this fact.

The feeling of national community gives birth to patriotism. Sound patriotism does not constitute a menace to other nations.

Sometimes, however, it degenerates into a desire to dominate others, based on assumed special ability and special rights. Such a morbid nationalism aims at the extension of the national substance, mainly of the territory, turning into imperialism.

Imperialism is always universal. Every imperialism aims at the conquest of new land and its logical conclusion can be only domination over the entire surface of the earth. The only limit to the ambitions of imperialism is set by the means which it has at its disposal.

Thus nationalism, regional by its very nature, becomes universal as soon as it evolves into imperialism.

The objective of every universal movement is the consolidation of the whole of humanity within one organisation. There may be various universalisms. Socialism, Communism and Nazi-ism are all universal, for they aim at controlling the whole world. So are the more liberal plans of world government advanced by idealists such as Mr H. G. Wells.

Most universalisms, even if they start under a most benevolent guise, come to a point when they want to impose unity by force. The pattern of world history is one of a struggle between universal and regional tendencies.

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National consciousness is a fairly recent phenomenon of human history. At first there was only consciousness of membership of a small group—the family.

Only the most primitive peoples have remained at the stage at which there is no consciousness of a community larger than the family. In most cases the community has extended in various ways, depending on geographical and economical conditions. On the Steppes the patriarchal family grew into a tribe. In the ancient communities of the Mediterranean there was a patriotism of the city. Elsewhere the feeling of community embraced larger groups, mostly of common origin (European nationalism) or of common culture (China).

The scope of the community instinct was extended gradually, by evolution. Its growth was usually inspired by universalist ideas. This was the case in the development of the British nation, composed of several distinct peoples, still conscious of their individuality.

Sometimes larger communities were created artificially,

(Continued from page 1.)

between the Baltic, the Adriatic, the Aegean and the Black Sea, no matter what had been their attitude towards Germany in the past.

A vision of a glorious future is not enough. In this battle for the souls of millions, which is also a race against time, we want immediate diplomatic moves and a beginning of practical collaboration between the civilian and military representatives of our nations, both in Europe and in America. The unity, integrity and sovereignty of our common territories should be formally recognised by the Allies at an early date. This would greatly assist the internal consolidation, which is constantly progressing, but is bound to encounter a number of obstacles.

These are our aims as champions of the Central Federation.

by conquest. Such communities could remain permanent, however, only if there was geographical unity, economic community of interests or ethnical affinity. The period of conquest had to be sufficiently long to allow time for the mixing of the different components. Most modern nations have passed through that stage. The Polish tribes, all of similar origin, had to be held together by force before they formed the Polish nation. The North and the South of France had to be welded by force, but the geographical unity of France helped to build a sense of unity and thus to create the French nation.

When one of the conditions of unity is lacking, the regional tendencies are bound to win. That was the case of ancient Rome. In the earliest times Rome was but a city. Then it conquered Latium and later the whole of Italy. This territory, forming a geographical unity, was soon welded into a compact unit, especially as the ethnic origin of the people of the different provinces was similar. Force did no more than assist a natural evolution.

This was not the case of the other territories incorporated to the Roman Empire. Their long association with Rome was not without important consequences as far as language and culture are concerned, but force alone could not hold together artificially assembled parts. The centrifugal regional tendencies resulted in the splitting of the Empire, first into two parts—the Western and Eastern—and later into numerous components, which started their own independent lives.

The same thing happened to other great empires—for instance the Spanish Empire. A similar process can be observed within the British Empire, in spite of the ethnical homogeneity of most of its component parts. The forces of regionalism are at work not only in political organisms, but even in religious bodies such as Christianity. When Christianity extended its rule over vast territories of different character, unprepared for unification, regionalism reacted by schism and reformation.

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It is clear that the evolution of communal consciousness is progressing steadily towards larger units, from regionalism towards universalism. There is no doubt that national consciousness as we know it is but a stage in that evolution. It will eventually turn into a wider consciousness—the patriotism of the Slavs, of Europeans, then of the white race. Finally it will become a genuine and sincere feeling of human solidarity, embracing the whole of mankind.

The extension of the scope of communal consciousness cannot, however, be achieved through mere mechanical fusion of States. It has to be based on a real community of culture, which cannot be attained at a moment's notice. The common culture must be the synthesis of the component cultures of each of the former national units. It must be their continuation and therefore the common property of all the members of the new, larger community. Such a new culture becomes the foundation of a new, wider solidarity and patriotism.

This does not mean, of course, that national patriotism should be immediately abandoned in favour of the new, wider patriotism. National feeling is too deeply seated to be summarily replaced. To advocate human, or even all-European solidarity and patriotism at the time of a struggle against German imperialism would be equivalent to capitulation before the present enemy. In view of his superiority of numbers and organisation, the enemy would secure a position of supremacy in any European community. To accept universal union at this time would amount to a resignation of all national traditions, ideals and achievements.

Patriotism and attachment to national tradition are not identical with Jingoism, which is a dangerous menace, for it



promotes mistrust and hate among nations. Excessive nationalism leads inevitably towards imperialism—and therefore towards a clash with other nationalisms.

There is a current view that nationalism is out of date and that it should be abandoned, for the time of complete solidarity of all men has arrived.

The vigour and strength of the existing nationalisms do not seem to confirm the truth of such a statement. All those who are anxious for the sphere of human solidarity to extend beyond its present limits should bear in mind that every violent action brings with it inevitable reaction. Permanent evolution and progress require time.

If the present patriotisms are to be welded into a new feeling of community of a larger human group, all the component elements of the new entity should be ready for the union. The fusion cannot be achieved by simple mechanical combination. Neither can it be achieved through the establishment of various international organs meant to supplant the national governments. The establishment of such organs at the present stage of political evolution would amount to the handing of full power to the large nations. Some of the British writers advocating solutions of this type speak at the same time about the important part to be played in the future

Europe by Russia and by "democratic" Germany. This is significant.

Any arrangement made mainly for the sake of the big "protectors" would be unsatisfactory from the point of view of the smaller nations. They may be compelled to accept such decisions, but they will always resist them whenever opportunity permits. Their resistance may or may not be successful. Some of the smaller nations may even be wiped off the map. Their discontent, however, will always be a source of unrest—which is exactly what the authors of plans of consolidation want to avoid.

The calming down of European nationalisms and the fusion of all the European nations in one homogeneous and permanent entity is still a long way away. The first stage should be the consolidation of the smaller Central European nations within a regional unit. Such a unit, based on a community of origin and culture, on common interests, equality and mutual respect, will possess all that is necessary for building a new communal consciousness and a patriotism of a higher order. Its achievement will be an important step towards the final consolidation of our continent, leading eventually to the birth of a genuine European community and then to a greater solidarity, embracing the whole of mankind.

## THE FEDERATION OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN NATIONS

by ZBIGNIEW STACHOWSKI.

The present war will decide the shape of the world for the next few centuries. Our war aims cannot be individual national aims, although the liberation of the conquered nations is the first immediate objective. Our war aims should fit into a general pattern of a world plan.

After liquidating the worst international criminals, the world must guarantee peace and freedom of trade, as well as cultural exchange between nations. These are basic conditions of human progress.

In spite of some misleading appearances, Europe is still the most dynamic part of the world. It still holds the key to the peace of all the other continents. If there was internal harmony within Europe, major wars in other parts of the world would be almost impossible. Only an internally consolidated Europe can still control the rising tide of the yellow races.

The Allies should keep in mind, next to their battle watchword of "war for survival and for freedom," the constructive idea of a new organisation of Europe.

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The achievement of European harmony and therefore world peace requires the establishment in Europe of large, super-national State organisations.

There are two different methods of building such super-national organisations: the formal union and the structural union, binding several States and nations in permanent organic association. The League of Nations was an example of a formal union of sovereign States, which remained entirely separate entities. It was a failure, and it did not prevent acts of aggression by some of its members.

Soviet Russia produced a revolutionary method of achieving international unity. All the nations, however, which were "invited" to join the Soviet Union either declined the honour or agreed only under pressure.

There were after the last world war some examples of organic, structural unions of nations: Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The idea was right, but it was applied on a too small scale to guarantee security against German attack.

Higher structural unions can be built only by evolution. That is the case of Switzerland—which is, however, too small

to permit far-reaching conclusions—and of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Evolution does not necessarily have to take centuries, as it did in the case of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Evolution may also be fairly rapid, but it involves the building of a large super-national organisation by stages. The first stage would be, naturally, that of smaller, regional organisations of neighbouring countries. The next stage would be the creation, on the basis of the regional unions, of organisations embracing large sections of a continent. These organisations can in turn enter agreements with a world scope.

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There are several conditions to be fulfilled by any structural super-national organisation, if it is to be permanent and successful:

Each of the associated nations should keep its freedom of national life.

The more striking injustices and wrongs, whether social or political, should be removed.

The associated nations should have common interests with regard to other countries.

The territory of the union should be as compact as possible and have favourable natural frontiers.

There should be within the union a distinct centre of gravity, both economic and political.

The union as a whole should be sufficiently strong to withstand any possible attack by any of its neighbours.

No doubt the realisation of all these conditions may be difficult, but a union can and should be started even without all of them, if the remaining conditions are likely to be eventually achieved. Of course, such a union will lack at first the strength of an organisation more favoured by circumstances. In Central Europe, however, practically all the conditions required for successful union are present.

The idea of Paneuropa is a typically formal plan, which does not take into account the character and desires of the nations concerned. Besides, if it was to be realised after the war, it would result in a most unfair solution. It would bind together all nations, irrespective of their conduct in recent times; nations guilty of the most horrible international



crimes with nations which had been their victims. It is difficult to see how any reparation of the wrongs done by the Germans could be carried out if all the nations, both victorious and defeated, were to be treated alike. The German mind will have to be educated and changed. This can hardly be achieved if Germany is to be granted equality at once.

Excluding, for some time at any rate, the Axis powers, we should have two large groups of nations in Europe: those west of the "Axis" and those east of the line Berlin-Rome. Each of these two groups would base its unity on permanent geopolitical facts, not merely on dictates of current policy. Each of them would fulfil to a high degree the conditions required for a successful and internationally useful structural union of nations.

The post-war organisation of Western Europe is, strictly speaking, outside the scope of our subject. We shall therefore not dwell on details. It is, however, to be assumed that such a union will arise and its relation to other powers can be deduced from geopolitical data known to us.

The plan for an organisation of the nations of Central Europe would find increased usefulness and interest if there existed a corresponding plan for Western Europe.

It is obvious that only Britain can be the nucleus of a western union of nations. She is qualified for that part by her natural position, her political importance and by the moral qualities displayed in the present war. A new, rebuilt London will be the political and economic capital of all the countries between the North Cape and Gibraltar, including Scandinavia, the Low Countries, Belgium, France and Portugal.

We are not concerned with the internal structure of the Western European union. Unlike the Central Federation, it may not necessarily require super-national organisation. A close system of alliances and economic agreements, centred on Great Britain, may be sufficient.

The Central Federation should include all the nations living east of Germany and Italy, but west of Russia, which have been so far inviting aggression by their weakness and disunity. The population of that part of Europe consists mainly of Slavs, subdivided into two large groups, the Western and the Southern Slavs. Most of them were organised before the present war within four States—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. There were also many Slavs within the frontiers of Germany, Italy, Rumania and Hungary. Central Europe includes also the two "Danubian nations", Hungary and Rumania. Albania and Greece may be regarded, for all practical purposes, as members of the same group.

### From General Sikorski's speech of April 21, 1942, to the Polish National Council

"My conversations in Washington, as well as those of the Foreign Secretary, dealt also with our plans for post-war reconstruction in Central Europe, notably with plans for a Central European Federation. There can be no permanent peace unless that region is properly organised and economically strengthened. The blocks of nations which will be formed in that part of the world should be federations, modelled to some extent on the United States. There should be full political, military, customs and monetary union, with common economic planning for the whole area. Only nations united by such bonds will be able to keep Germany in check, together with the western federations. Otherwise the nations of Europe would risk after victory another war within twenty-five years, or the hegemony of one power."

The countries concerned form a fairly compact geographical unit, enclosed by the Baltic, the Adriatic and the Black Sea. If Greece is to be included, the Aegean would be the southern boundary. Apart from the seas, the Central Region has a considerable length of natural mountain frontiers. The western boundary of the Central European Region is formed, from the Adriatic, by the Kars mountains, the Austrian Alps, the Bohemian Forest mountains and the Krkonose mountains. Farther north there is no such natural frontier apart from the river Oder (Odra), but the shortest boundary—a straight line to the Baltic—would be only 200 miles in length. Such a frontier would practically coincide with the limit of settlement of the Western Slavs.

The north-eastern frontier of Central Europe is less clearly defined. The rivers Niemen, Zbrucz and Prut—as well as Dzvina and Dnieper or Worskla—have been used at times. The eastern frontier of Poland under the treaty of Riga was a compromise between some of these alternatives.

There is no sharp ethnographical boundary between Central and Eastern Europe, as different Slav nationalities are intermixed on both sides of their frontiers. The most satisfactory dividing line would be a boundary between zones of cultural influence—western and eastern.

Its final settlement will largely depend upon the further development of relations between neighbouring nations.

Central Europe is a geopolitical area which, although some of its frontiers are still insufficiently defined, is a compact unity with excellent conditions for political and economic consolidation. By number of inhabitants and natural resources this unit could equal, or even surpass, the strength of the German Reich. After partial industrialisation, which could be easily accomplished, the Central European Federation could be an effective counterweight to the Axis Powers.

The Western and Central European Federations, different in character—one maritime and the other mainly continental—would be ideally fitted for permanent collaboration. They could have no conflicting interests, owing to their different structure and to the absence of any common frontier—except the sea. They would complete each other and could guarantee security and peace for an indefinite period of time.

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The political union of the Central European nations should, on the one hand, be sufficiently close to secure permanence and adequate defence; on the other, it should be free and loose enough to allow every nation opportunities for individual development and to prevent friction between nations which have had feuds in the past.

It seems, therefore, that the most suitable form of organisation for Central Europe would be a Federation of States. The "Central European Federation" would consist of a number of States, which would in principle remain sovereign, except for matters in which not only solidarity but single representation would be necessary in the interests of the union.

The following domains would require common administration:

- (a) Foreign relations.
- (b) Defence.
- (c) Economic collaboration, aiming at customs union.

Unity in these spheres would require the establishment of a number of co-ordinating, as well as executive and legislative bodies. These federal institutions might be formed according to one of several patterns. For the time being we shall not discuss them in detail.

If the Federation of Central Europe is to be an organic, structural union, it will require—besides the legal and administrative institutions which we have referred to—some much deeper and stronger internal bonds of unity. They will be required to maintain the Union in times of strife and danger, as well as to prevent its gradual dissolution.

(Continued at foot of page 6.)



# BALKAN UNION

## FREE BULGARIANS AND BALKAN UNION

by KOSTA TODOROV, former Member of Bulgarian Government.

First of all I want to stress that the Bulgarians are Slavs. I am doing so because, as in the last war, the German propaganda in Bulgaria is trying again to convince the people that the Bulgarians are a nation of Mongolian origin. Meanwhile, history records the following facts: when the "Volgars" (whose origin was more or less obscure) arrived in the territory known as Bulgaria to-day, they found there purely Slavonic races whose numbers were four times superior to their own. They formed a military caste that waged many wars and later disappeared during the Middle Ages. We are opposed to the racial theory and do not believe in any pure races. The blood of the Germans who propagate this theory is just as mixed as that of all other nations. It is notably so in Prussia and Saxony, where the mixing of Slavs and Germans was most thorough.

Conscious feeling matters much more than blood. The Bulgarians are Slavs by their feeling, tradition and language, and they tend towards a Slav unity. We believe that the Europe of to-morrow, after so much suffering, bloodshed and misfortune, will succeed in creating an organisation which will guarantee its peace and prosperity. A general European union is the ideal to which we all look forward. However,

we are no day-dreamers who believe that such a union could be achieved in a few months or even years. We therefore believe that it will suffice for the beginning to solve our local problems in all separate geographic areas, and to proceed towards the greater ideal gradually.

That is why, looking at the problem from a realistic point of view, we will first and foremost seek a solution of the Balkan question. The following are the Balkan countries: Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece and Albania; to which Rumania and Turkey could be added if they wanted to belong to a Balkan union.

We are speaking of Rumania and Turkey conditionally because the latter is a country situated in West Asia, while a great number of Rumanians consider their own country as a part of Central Europe rather than of the Balkans.

Such a union could not be realised within a few days; it would also have to be created by evolution unless events themselves take a revolutionary turn. What we want is evolution, because a revolution, though it may solve all problems radically, involves invariably a price of suffering too heavy for peoples exhausted by the war.

In the Balkans there are twenty-two million Slavs who belong to the Southern Slavonic group. The most natural thing would be for them to unite, and then—as soon as possible—to create a Balkan Union which could be a most vital unit both geographically and economically. There is already in existence a Yugoslav-Greek Agreement regarding the Balkan Union, a fact which we have to recognise. But in the long run of events, the decision about such an agreement has to be taken by the peoples concerned. It is true that we do not doubt that the peoples will accept the main ideas of this Agreement; but we also believe that after the end of the War a spontaneous union of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria will necessarily become the nucleus of a Balkan Federation. To remove any misunderstanding we have to stress that the above statement is not directed against Greece in the least. The Bulgarian Committee, to whom the writer has the honour to belong, has accepted the basic ideas expressed in the Greco-Yugoslav Agreement, and informed the Governments of the countries concerned in London of their decision by a letter which you will find on another page of the present issue. Without Greece, no real Balkan Agreement in a political, economic or geographic sense of the word is possible. However, the natural tendencies towards uniting Bulgaria and Yugoslavia will, without any doubt, prove stronger than any other Balkan movements, regardless of the present artificial situation in Bulgaria.

What would be the relations of the Balkan Union with the other countries and groups already existing as well as those which will be formed after the War? Let us deal with a united Central Europe in the first place. A Polish Czecho-Slovak Union, uniting over forty-five million people, has already been formed as a contribution towards it. We do not know what other countries there will be in North Europe after the War, or in what form; neither do we know to what Federation they will belong. It is difficult to discuss this subject to-day. As regards Rumania, she may belong to the Balkan or Central European Confederation. In either case she would be a link between the Balkans and Central Europe. It is a very fortunate thing that after the final solution of the question of Dobrudja there are no more difficult problems between Bulgaria and Rumania. Rumania could therefore be very useful in linking us with the bloc

*The West-Slavonic Bulletin* (March 1942) has published the following letter of the Free Bulgarians to the Yugoslavian Foreign Secretary:

Londres, le 27 janvier, 1942.

A son Excellence Dr. M. Nintchitch,  
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Yougoslave.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Nous sommes chargés, au nom du Comité National Bulgare, „la Bulgarie Libre et Indépendante”, de vous déclarer ce qui suit:

Le Comité considère que l'accord signé entre les gouvernements yougoslave et hellénique à Londres, en date du 15 janvier, constitue le premier pas vers la création de l'Unité Balcanique qui a toujours été la base du programme des organisations politiques bulgares que notre Comité représente.

Nous rappelons à ce sujet qu'une fois nous avons eu l'honneur de souligner dans les conversations avec vous notre désir ardent de voir cette unité se réaliser dans l'égalité de toutes les nations balcaniques.

Nous sommes donc heureux de constater que le traité d'unité yougoslave-hellénique laisse à l'avenir la porte ouverte à l'adhésion à ce traité de tous les autres pays balcaniques, par conséquent à la Bulgarie.

Comme d'autre part, après la victoire que nous croyons absolument assurée, notre Comité et les organisations politiques que nous représentons vont constituer sans aucun doute la base du futur gouvernement bulgare démocratique. Nous avons l'honneur de vous affirmer dès à présent, que ce gouvernement adhérera au pacte d'unité balcanique conclu en date du 15 janvier, 1942, entre les gouvernements yougoslave et hellénique, afin d'assurer par la participation de la Bulgarie, la fraternité et la collaboration étroite dans tous les domaines de toutes les nations balcaniques.

Pour le Comité:

Dr. G. M. Dimitroff,  
Ancien Député.  
Kosta Todoroff,  
Ancien Ministre.  
Dimitri Matzankieff,  
Ancien Député.



of Western Slavs. This union of both blocs would be the second stage, while the third one—according to the general evolution of Europe during the coming few decades—might mean a union of the whole of Europe.

What will happen to other countries belonging to the Central European geographical group? This question concerns Austria and Hungary, because for many years (and possibly even decades) one could not speak seriously of incorporating Germany within any of the blocs, until the German megalomania will have been finally cured after a long quarantine.

The incorporation of Austria would not be in the interests of the Balkan and Central European nations with a predominantly Slavonic element. We regard the claim that Austria has been compelled to join Hitler's Reich as a fairy tale. Greater Germany tendencies were always strong in Austria. It would be much more natural for Austria to be united with Bavaria and the Provinces of the Rhineland and thus form a kind of separate German Federation, than to enter the planned Central European Bloc. Of course, this German Federation would also have to be kept in quarantine as well as all the rest of Germany.

As regards the Hungarians, the prerequisite for their acceptance into any federation of free countries would be a total destruction of the Hungarian feudal system and the corrupt and megalomaniac Hungarian aristocracy; the next condition would be the establishment of a fully fledged democracy and the foregoing by the Hungarians of all their imperialist claims symbolised by the so-called "St Stephen's Crown".

The most important question regarding the relations of the Balkan and Central European Federations is perhaps the question of our joint relations with Soviet Russia who will be our mightiest neighbour. Every combination turned directly or indirectly against Russia would be unacceptable to the Bulgarian people. It would be contrary to all our tradition and feeling. Even the present Bulgarian rulers, although they are ordinary servants of Hitler's tyranny, hesitated for years before they dared to push the people into an open war against Russia.

Every national administration in Bulgaria will naturally endeavour to establish the closest fraternal relations of

cultural, economic and political collaboration with Soviet Russia. We believe that this corresponds not only with our feeling but also with the real interests of all other nations who would eventually join the Balkan or Central European Federations. We base our belief on the following facts:—

Russia does not need any new territory;  
Russia could only threaten those who harboured openly or secretly hostile intentions against her.

As presumably not one of the above Federations would have any such intention, we firmly believe in the possibility of establishing such relations with Soviet Russia as to exclude any chance of a conflict in Eastern Europe. It will be very useful for Russia herself to have groups of friendly nations which would in no case become tools of would-be aggressors, on her western and near-eastern frontiers. After this war, Russia may need, more than all the rest of Europe, peaceful conditions in which to organise her economic life and achieve as solid a security as possible in the west. The main pre-occupation of a Central European or Balkan Union will be to keep a constant watch over the movements of Germany and Italy. These two countries will have to be under a continuous pressure of our organised forces.

Regarding Western Europe, geography itself and the absence of any divergence of interests between our Federation and that of Western Europe can provide the best basis for our friendship and very cordial relations with that area. The only problems connected with Western Europe that interest us will be those of the economic relations with that part of Europe; these relations, instead of being based on the pre-war practice of competition, will have to be established on a foundation of harmony which will be of great advantage to all European nations.

It is obvious that at present one imperative task is dwarfing all other issues, and that is to win the War. That is why all the subjugated European nations should fight shoulder to shoulder; they should help every revolutionary movement directed against Germany, and they should become accustomed to regard any part of this struggle, wherever it may be waged, as a battle for the common cause.

(Continued from page 4.)

In the first section of the present article we have enumerated the conditions necessary for the permanent success of super-national organisations. The Central European Federation will be able to fulfil them all.

The Union can secure very good natural frontiers, within which it will form a compact geopolitical unit. The free development of the member nations will be guaranteed by the federal constitution. All frontier disputes and other controversies between the member nations will have a better opportunity for smooth solution than they ever could have outside a federal system. The immense benefits conferred on all the member nations by the Union will be a strong incentive to unity and harmonious collaboration.

One of the vital conditions of permanent success for a Union, especially one embracing a large group of nations of different character, is the presence within the union of one—or several—strong and homogeneous political organisms, capable of becoming the pillars of such an association.

We do not visualise the Union of Central European Nations as a simple federation of all the nationalities in that part of Europe. First of all the Slav nations will form two federal States—the Western and Southern Slavonic Unions. The Central Federation, embracing all the nations of Central Europe, whether Slavonic or not, will be the next stage.

The Central European Federation will therefore be composed of the following components:

(1) The Western Slavonic Union, consisting of Poland and Czechoslovakia. This would be the hard core of the

Central Federation, with about 50 per cent. of its population and 80 per cent. of its industry.

(2) The Southern Slavonic Union, which would include, in one way or another, all the four southern Slavonic nations—the Serbs, Croats, Bulgarians and Slovenes. We hope that such a union may be achieved in the near future. The union of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria has been planned before and it would be certainly beneficial to both countries.

The present frontiers of Southern Slavdom would have to be slightly revised at the expense of Germany and Italy. The inclusion of Istria with Trieste and of Carinthia would give to the Southern Slavs an excellent natural frontier in the west, as well as the use of the port of Trieste.

(3) The Danubian nations, Hungary and Rumania, would join the Central European Union almost automatically, as the natural consequence of its establishment. They are already surrounded by Slavs in the north, south and east. When the Western and Southern Slavs form a closer association, the Hungarians and Rumanians will be unable to stay out of it.

The Vallachians and Moldavians have belonged, practically throughout their history, to various larger political bodies, and they did not seem to protest against it at all. As to the Hungarians, they have been voluntarily associated with the Austrian Empire for three hundred years. Soon after becoming independent, these two nations submitted without the slightest opposition to the strongest power of the Continent—Germany—and followed its leadership.



# FEDERATION IN THE COMMON INTEREST

by GRGA ZLATOPER.

(Translation from the Serbian original)

It is not a mere coincidence that the Slavonic countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia—together with Greece—should be the first to decide, while the War is still on, to lay the first foundations of a future international organisation in their own areas and those of their neighbours. They formed their units—Poland and Czechoslovakia by a confederation, and Greece and Yugoslavia by an agreement regarding the creation of a Balkan Union—to safeguard their future against any dangers and to make possible a more harmonious life and progress within their common frontiers. This is in their own interest as well as that of Europe. In addition, benefiting from their wide experience in the present War, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia realised that they ought to be more permanently aware of the German danger, which has always been directed mainly against Slavdom.

There are, however, other tendencies regarding the future organisation of various parts of the European Continent. These tendencies come from various quarters. Nevertheless, they remain for the present "at the propaganda stage"—unfortunately that of an influential propaganda—while the representatives of Warsaw, Prague, Athens and Belgrade have already achieved the first step towards their aim. Thus the triangle of Baltic-Adriatic-Black-Aegean Seas is already encompassed to-day by a strong will to put into practice immediately after the War a constructive policy of large units and a wide collaboration based on goodwill, equality and freedom.

It is, however, to be hoped that the greatest possible consideration will be given to the work which has already been started. This should be done both on account of the intrinsic value of the plan of collaboration and also because it would be a mistake to leave the field open for the rival

tendencies. It is true that they may be unpractical, as they are not the expression of the wishes of the majority of the peoples concerned. Nevertheless, they may have a damaging effect through their influential promoters. We must therefore always make it clear to the world that the Slavonic element—in its own area—is the majority; that majority is decisive in the freedom for which we are fighting to-day; and consequently that no plans which are not approved by such a majority can be realised. Everybody who does not wish the recurrence of the trials which we are enduring to-day should bear it in mind. Fighting for the freedom of the individual, it is natural that each country also should be granted freedom to join larger units which would correspond to its feeling, its political tendencies and to the economic necessities of life. In other words, we cannot fight for the freedom of man without desiring the freedom of nations as well.

These remarks might seem quite superfluous. In fact, stressing this point is far from unnecessary. Let us recollect the attempts to organise our part of Europe—which I would describe as "the Slav Europe"—in a way which we disliked, and we shall see immediately that it is never superfluous to stress the necessity of freedom and self-determination, that is to say of a free decision by every country regarding its adherence to future European Federations.

Poland, Czechoslovakia, Greece and Yugoslavia have already freely and spontaneously declared for wider units within their boundaries. It is odd that some people should attempt to under-estimate this fact, and even to prevent its further consequences. This is peculiar, to say the least, because those who admit the principle of freedom cannot deny the value of our free decisions. Otherwise they would be in flagrant contradiction with their own principles.

(Continued at foot of page 8.)

These two nations have a definite interest in joining the Union. It will give them peace, which they desire above all, opportunities for free national development and a degree of prosperity.

The Slavs, by their very nature, are less likely than any other nation to turn the association of Hungary and Rumania with them into a form of servitude. On the contrary, both Western and Southern Slavs could certainly guarantee full internal freedom to Hungary and Rumania. There would not be any ground for the violation of such a pledge, provided Hungary and Rumania remained loyal to the Union.

The Transylvanian dispute between Hungary and Rumania should be solved as fairly as possible. Owing to the presence of mixed populations, with a sprinkling of Germans, the problem is complex. The attitude of Hungary and Rumania in the present war may influence the solution of this question. If one of these countries should turn against Germany, when an appropriate opportunity occurs, such an action might seriously affect its future relations with the other Central European nations.

Hungary has several territorial disputes with its Slav neighbours. They are the legacy of the period when the invading Magyars drove a wedge between Slavonic nations. There is no reason, however, why the conflict between Slavs and Magyars should continue for ever.

It is to be hoped that Hungary, which has always been a friend of Poland, will realise—as well as Rumania—that they can play an honourable part by acting as a bridge between

the north and the south, instead of being an alien body in a Slav sea.

(4) The other neighbouring countries could join the Central European Union voluntarily, encouraged by the great benefits conferred by its membership.

This is the case of Greece, which forms the natural southern boundary of the Central European zone. The participation of Greece in a Central European Union is particularly desirable, as it would open to the Slavs an access to the Aegean. Greece is already bound to Yugoslavia by an alliance, while the heroism of the Greeks in the present war leaves no doubt as to their attitude towards a union of free nations.

The attitude of the Lithuanian people in the final stages of our struggle would decide their relations to the Central European Union.

According to pre-war statistics, the total population of the potential members of the Central European Union is over 100 million while their joint area is about 1,350 square kilometres. After some territorial changes at the expense of Germany and Italy, the population and area of the Union would be even greater. It would become the second largest country in Europe, next to Russia, and the sixth power in the world—after the British Empire, China, Russia, U.S.A. and the Japanese Empire.

A Union of such strength, based on two powerful Slav blocks—in the north and in the south—would be capable of guaranteeing permanent peace in Europe.

*West-Slavonic Bulletin* (February 1941).



# FROM THE POLISH SECRET PRESS

*Published in occupied Poland, September 1940.*

We Poles are a medium-sized nation by our numbers. Destiny placed us between two great, aggressive powers—Russia and Germany. Side by side with us are many medium and small nations, living in the same conditions. They are the Czechs, Slovaks, Rumanians, Ukrainians, White Ruthenians, Lithuanians, Latvians and others.

These nations have been withstanding enemy pressure for many centuries. There was Germanic pressure from the west and Asiatic-Muscovite pressure from the east.

None of these nations can hope to maintain its freedom and independence single-handed.

Combined, these nations can be powerful. Let us consider only the Czechs, Slovaks, Ukrainians and White Ruthenians, whose origin, culture and historical tradition have much in common with our own. Together with the Poles they form a mass of a hundred million people.

These nations live in a vast area between the Baltic and the Black Sea, on fertile soil, rich in natural resources and well adapted for development.

They all have much in common. They are all Slavs, their languages are similar, while their cultural and historical tradition can be largely traced to a single source.

They are also youthful and vigorous nations, with a predominance of peasants. They all have a similar social structure, characterised by a dynamic force of fresh generations.

Are these youthful, healthy nations to be thwarted for ever by brutal violence?

Certainly not. They will have to find new forms of life and creative work.

All these nations should discover a great and bold conception of a common State. They possess all that is necessary to make that State morally and materially strong, capable of resisting any onslaught. The enemy does his utmost to make the Ukrainian hate the Pole, the Slovak hate the Czech and *vice versa*. It is easier to crush and exploit divided nations.

But we remember that the unity of Poles, Ukrainians, Czechs and Lithuanians resulted in the victory of Grünwald, which threw the enemy back from the gates of Slavdom.

We also know that the solidarity and brotherhood of these nations held at bay the Tartars and Turks.

We know that when we were united, the Slavs were strong; when we quarrelled, we were all enslaved. We have a record of common achievements and triumphs of the Slav brotherhood.

Our independence and freedom is our common concern. The Polish peasants realise that the Czechs, Poles, Ukrainians, Slovaks and White Ruthenians have to join their forces and establish a common Federal State.

It will be a union of brother nations. Each of these nations will have a full freedom of cultural development and national life. Each will be governed according to its own will and needs.

All the citizens of the State, no matter where domiciled, will enjoy full rights in its entire territory.

The boundaries between the member nations will be traced by a common agreement and left in common trust. In matters of defence and of relations with other powers, the Federal State will act as one homogeneous unit.

A Federal State organised along such lines will keep pace with the other great powers and it will guarantee the security of its member nations. Its creation will automatically relieve the other European nations from the German and Russian pressure. Other nations may eventually join the Federation.

We hope that the Southern Slavs will also combine in a common union. Then the two Federations will join hands by co-ordinating their foreign policies and they will confidently face the future together.

*"Naród," January 20, 1942*

"The endeavour of Poland, supported by her Slav neighbours, to play a leading part on the continent of Europe runs parallel to the interests of Great Britain. Great Britain realises that even a large Commonwealth of Slav nations can never become a rival of the British Empire."

*(Continued from page 7.)*

I would like to add some comment concerning the intentions of those not sharing our views, who would like to organise our own—predominantly Slav part of Europe—in their own way. Well, we should be able to know better the situation in the Baltic-Adriatic-Aegean triangle than those who are strangers in that area. Our opinion should therefore, to say the least, be given serious consideration when making plans for the organisation of the Slav Europe. This point of view has found a sufficiently clear expression in the official acts of the Polish, Czechoslovak, Greek and Yugoslav Governments in London, that is to say, in the Polish-Czechoslovak Agreement regarding confederation, and the Greco-Yugoslav Agreement regarding a Balkan Union. Both these facts deserve full consideration and every praise.

Nevertheless, the ties between Poland and Czechoslovakia should be made even closer, since they are Slav sister nations. On the other hand, it has to be borne in mind that Bulgaria should be included within the framework of the Balkan Union. This issue is, however, complicated by the traditionally unstable attitude of Bulgaria as well as her attitude towards the Serbs in the past wars, and towards Yugoslavia in this one.

Taken from a geographical, political, economic or temperamental point of view, the Bulgarians belong to the Balkans and to the Slavs. This is a fact. On the other hand, Bulgaria's past and present attitude is causing much suspicion as regards the future. She is therefore an uncertain quantity.

In spite of all this, the foundations for a Balkan Union have been laid. Its founders are Greece and Yugoslavia, which is natural. The common fate of Greece and Yugoslavia in this War, their traditional relations and the non-existence of any neighbourly quarrels—all this binds the two countries for the present and for the future. The agreement signed by Greece and Yugoslavia on 15th January in London was therefore based on natural conditions and realities.

The Greco-Yugoslav solidarity is a good beginning, while a watchful attitude towards Bulgaria will be necessary for the ultimate realisation of the Balkan Union.

We should not leave this subject without mentioning the important words spoken recently by the highest Yugoslav authority. At the signature of the agreement with Greece, His Majesty King Peter II said in his great speech, "Our present Agreement is in my opinion an important beginning towards the realisation of a great union, political and economic, in South-Eastern Europe, which will be an expression of the great unity of interests of its nations, prevent their international conflicts and create a mighty defence force against any external aggression".

The characteristics of a powerful union in South-Eastern Europe should be such as not to leave aside its Slav nature. This is particularly true as another two Slav countries, Poland and Czechoslovakia, are organising with the same objects and tendencies. The importance of the Polish-Czechoslovak activity for us is obvious. It is the organising of the Slavs



# CONFEDERATION OR FEDERAL UNION ?

by DR. KAREL LOCHER

(Translation from the Czech original)

On 19th January 1942, the Polish and Czechoslovak Governments concluded in London the following agreement :—

The Governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia have agreed on the following points with regard to the future Confederation of Poland and Czechoslovakia :—

(1) The two Governments desire that the Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation should embrace other states of the European area with which the vital interests of Poland and Czechoslovakia are linked up.

(2) The purpose of the Confederation is to assure common policy with regard to :—

- (a) Foreign affairs.
- (b) Defence.
- (c) Economic and financial matters.
- (d) Social questions.
- (e) Transport, posts and telegraphs.

(3) The Confederation will have a common general staff, whose task it will be to prepare the means of defence, while in the event of war a unified supreme command will be appointed.

(4) The Confederation will co-ordinate the policy of foreign trade and custom tariffs of the states forming the Confederation, with the view to the conclusion of a customs union.

(5) The Confederation will have an agreed monetary policy. Autonomous banks of issue of the states forming the Confederation will be maintained. It will be their task to assure that the parity established between the various national currencies shall be permanently maintained.

(6) The development and administration of railway, road, water and air transport, as also of the telecommunication services will be carried out according to a common plan. An identical tariff for postal and telecommunication services will be binding on all territories of the Confederation.

The states in possession of sea and inland harbours will take into consideration the economic interests of the Confederation as a whole. Moreover, the states forming the Confederation will mutually support the interests of the sea and inland harbours of the states forming the Confederation.

(7) The Confederation will co-ordinate the financial policies of the states forming the Confederation especially with regard to taxation.

(8) Co-ordination will also be applied in the realm of social policy of the various states of the Confederation.

(9) The Confederation will assure co-operation among its members in educational and cultural matters.

(10) Questions of nationality will remain within the competence of the individual states forming the Confederation. The passenger traffic between the various states included in the Confederation will take place without any restrictions, in particular without passports and visas. The question of the free domicile and of the right to exercise any gainful occupation of the citizens of the individual states forming the Confederation over the whole territory of the Confederation will be regulated.

(11) The question of the mutual recognition by the states forming the Confederation of school and professional diplomas, of documents and sentences of courts, as well as the question of mutual legal aid, in particular in the execution of court sentences, will be regulated.

(12) The Constitutions of the individual states included in the Confederation will guarantee to the citizens of these States the following rights :—

- (a) Freedom of conscience.
- (b) Personal freedom.
- (c) Freedom of learning.
- (d) Freedom of the spoken and written word.
- (e) Freedom of assembly and association.
- (f) Equality of all citizens before the law.
- (g) Free admission of all citizens to the performance of all state functions.
- (h) The independence of the Courts of Law.
- (i) The control of government by representative national bodies elected by means of free elections.

(13) Both Governments have agreed that in order to ensure the common Policy with regard to the above-mentioned spheres, the establishment of common organs of the Confederation will be necessary.

(14) The states included in the Confederation will jointly defray the costs of its maintenance.

As champions of the closest collaboration between the Western Slavonic nations, the Czechs, Slovaks and Poles, we desire a union of those peoples. In consequence we welcome every act leading towards such union. Unfortunately, the agreement of 19th January is not fully satisfactory from the point of view of Federal Union, which is our policy.

of one region and bringing them closer to the union of the Southern Slav region. The importance of these efforts can best be expressed by the words of the young Yugoslav monarch, who added in his speech that the Greco-Yugoslav Agreement "would not achieve its full purpose even after the realisation of the Balkan Union, unless the rest of Europe is organised in such a way as to result in a new international order. We have reason to hope that a Central European Union, based on the principles of the Czechoslovak-Polish Agreement, will be created simultaneously with the Balkan Union. In our opinion, these two unions, based on the same principles and inspired by the same ideals, would form, by means of a joint supreme organ, a great organisation which would provide important guarantees for peace and prosperity in Europe".

These words, the importance of which is evident, are in agreement with the statements of the Polish and Czechoslovak Governments in their Declaration of the 24th January. "The security and progress of the part of Europe situated between the Baltic and Aegean Seas depend mainly upon the collaboration between the two confederations, one of which is based on the Polish-Czechoslovak Pact, and the other on the Greco-Yugoslav Agreement".

From this it can be concluded that :—

(a) Poland, Czechoslovakia, Greece and Yugoslavia have already contributed something towards the future order, both in their home countries and among their neighbours. Whoever wants to change that order can do so only with the knowledge and consent of these countries.

(b) The policy of Warsaw-Prague on the one hand and that of Belgrade-Athens on the other should be worked out in greater detail. Poland and Czechoslovakia should deepen the work they have begun, while Greece and Yugoslavia should complete their task in the Balkan Sector.

(c) In this way, the four countries could form a great organisation in which the Slav element would be predominant, together with other countries which are now standing aside. The stressing of this natural power should not lead anyone to wrong conclusions. It is time for the Slavs to organise their own peaceful lives within their boundaries and help others in a fair way to achieve a life of common creative work in freedom and justice.

The way towards creating units which would be in the common interest is open. We Slavs must show an organised will and strive towards progress through fraternal harmony.



The shortcomings of the agreement are made clear by a perusal of its clauses :—

Clause 1 fails to state what other countries are expected to join the Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation. The vague decision to include "other countries bound to the signatories by vital interests" is liable to various interpretation,—a fact confirmed by a comparison between the Polish Foreign Secretary's (Count Raczynski) interview in *The Sunday Times* and Dr. Benesh's Aberdeen speech, as well as some of his later declarations.

Clause 2 deals with obvious matters, without which any association between States would be unthinkable.

Clause 3 coincides with our aims. Unfortunately, its wording opens the way for interpretations which we cannot accept. The official organ of the Czechoslovak Forces *Naše Noviny* of 28th January 1942, a few days after signature of the agreement, published the following interpretation of that clause: "Every country will have its own general staff, its own ministry of defence and will keep the national character of its army intact. The common general staff will co-ordinate defence, prepare common strategic plans and standardise equipment". This interpretation is, in our opinion, contradictory to clause 3. It is easy to picture the confusion which would result from the co-existence of several national staffs and one common general staff, as well as several national ministries of defence and one common ministry. Such an organisation would be entirely inadequate for dealing with a powerful enemy who has centralised control.

Clause 4 fails to specify whether a customs union will actually be established and when it will be done. We believe a customs union to be an essential and indispensable feature of any federation, whether more or less intimate. Without customs union there can be no real federation. Such an association without a customs union would amount to no more than a repetition of the failure of the Little Entente.

Clauses 5 and 6 contain merely vague and indefinite statements. Nothing has been said about the establishment of a common bank, empowered to issue common currency. This is a vital condition of success for a genuine Federal Union.

Clause 7 fails to specify whether all transport will be under the control of one common ministry, or whether—if this is not to be the case—there will be a co-ordinating authority. Before the war transport was controlled in Czechoslovakia

by four and in Poland by two different departments (communications and post office). The same queries may arise also in connection with the social and educational problems dealt with under the other headings.

Clause 12 contains a declaration of policy which—commendable though it is—has little to do with federation.

An analysis of the agreement shows that it failed to provide practical and concrete solutions for the most vital problems. There is, on the other hand, much verbiage on less important subjects.

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The interests of our nations and of the future prosperity of Central Europe call for something more than the agreement of 19th January 1942. Alliances on the Little Entente pattern or vague Polish-Czechoslovak Confederations will not be enough. Only a compact, economically strong Polish-Czech-Slovak Union can safeguard our countries permanently against aggression. Such a union would become the corner-stone of a Union of Central Europe, which might include several other Federal Unions, or separate nations.

The Polish-Czech-Slovak Federal Union can be achieved immediately. All the necessary requisites are present. The obstacles are few and can be easily overcome. Such a Union would become a real power, capable of resisting any military or moral pressure hostile to the character of our nations. All the members of our communities love peace, freedom and equality. They are willing to obey laws which they make for themselves. They are used to a certain standard of living, though it may not be particularly high. Our part of Europe has been associated with Western Christianity for a thousand years. Central Europe needs political, economic and cultural conditions which would enable its inhabitants to live in accordance with these principles, not only as members of their respective nations, but also as members of a wider, super-national community which would guarantee their safety and livelihood.

Great achievements are born amidst suffering. A New Europe should arise from the chaos of fire that has been let loose. But faith in the future is not enough. We need action. Courage is needed to defeat narrow national egoisms in the interest of a greater common good.

## THE WAY TO FEDERATION

### FREE HUNGARIAN OPINION

*Free Hungarian Review.* Bulletin of the Association of Hungarians in Great Britain (published 1st April 1942).

(A.R.) With the beginning of spring the war machine of the Axis Powers prepares for a new desperate attack. It is the intention of the German High Command that the unhappy nations of South-Eastern Europe, compelled to serve the German ambitions as a consequence of the irresponsible and short-sighted policy of their respective governments, should play a prominent part in this campaign. The scarce news from Hungary reports, however, without exception the increasing resistance of the Hungarian people. For this reason the Nazi propaganda machine has to make use of new methods. According to the recent detailed account of the *Times* about Hungary, the Wilhelmstrasse, as well as its Hungarian mouthpieces, endeavour to win the Hungarian people for their own selfish ends by falsifying the aims of the agreements of federation concluded by the allied governments in London. Our German "wellwishers" argue that an Axis victory is evidently in Hungary's interest because otherwise the newly planned federations between Poland and Czechoslovakia in the north and between Yugoslavia and

Greece in the south will divide Hungary between themselves. By this unscrupulous falsification the Axis propaganda follows its well-tested method of creating antagonism, of inciting hatred between the European nations. The Wilhelmstrasse forgets, however, that the nations of Europe have had their lessons by the experience of the past. To-day we are all well aware that it was just the lack of unity between the nations of Eastern Europe that made it possible for Hitler to swallow one country after the other either by aggression or by so-called "friendly agreements". For this reason it is to our vital interest that we should co-operate with our neighbours in a spirit of understanding, and common democratic ideals. This is the only way to create a strong, healthy Eastern European Federation which is able to re-establish the balance of power of Europe against eighty million Germans who live in the heart of this Continent, and which at the same time can lay the foundation for a new political, economical and social order, conceived on a larger scale than in the past. The Polish-Czechoslovak and the Greek-Yugoslav agreements represent the first symptoms of this new conception. We must welcome them because their portent is in full harmony with Hungarian interests. The



first paragraph of the Polish-Czechoslovak Agreement expresses the desire that the neighbouring countries tied to the signatory powers by the bond of common interests should join the confederation. It is evident that this invitation is addressed to our country. It is not only the statement of the Polish Foreign Minister which confirms this assumption, but also the radio speech made in the Hungarian language by Dr Slavik, the Czechoslovak Minister for Home Affairs, on 14th March.

Though the war rages in four continents, it is in the interest of all of us to lay now the foundation stones for a European re-organisation which may re-establish and stabilise the European balance of power by creating larger political units, and abolish the unhealthy economical nationalism confined to narrow frontiers. This conception cannot be materialised unless it is based on political and economical collaboration. The federation schemes conceived after the last war did not survive because they were conceived on economical outlines only. Thus we must achieve full harmony in the sphere of political issues. Then by mutual goodwill and understanding we may establish the foundations for a better order in that part of the world.

German propaganda endeavours in vain to promote antagonism between our people and the Polish and Czechoslovak nations. It is clear for us that history, which by common fate in the past created many natural bonds between these three nations, prescribes for the future even much more in the way of co-operation. The three nations together may form a mighty federation of states with over fifty million inhabitants, within the borders of which each could keep its national and cultural independence. As to foreign relations, however, the task of securing European peace can be achieved only under joint direction. We must wholeheartedly welcome the

federation plan which indicates to the new, free, democratic Hungary the way of her future, and which would secure both for the nations and individuals political and spiritual freedom as well as social and economical prosperity.

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We remind our readers of another statement of Mr Lonyay, Chairman, Free Hungarians, in a letter published in the *Times* of 11th April 1942, denouncing the "strictly parliamentary régime" of the Horthy Hungary:—

"In Hungary before the last war the Parliament was a mere travesty of popular representation, but since the election of Horthy in 1920, when the Parliament was surrounded by picked shock troops and under threat of the bayonet decided in his favour, things turned even worse. Since then only in about 10 per cent. of the constituencies do the electors have the right to a secret vote, while in the other 90 per cent. there is an open ballot which exposes them to every kind of pressure. A number of laws enables the authorities to erase names from the lists of electors. Electioneering meetings can only be held by permission of the authorities. Also by law the constituencies are so organized that tens of thousands of votes are eliminated.

"Had the truly elected members of the people sat in a free Parliament, (1) Hungary would have found ways and means for a friendly understanding with all her neighbours, and a mutually beneficial revision of Trianon could have been reached; (2) Hungary would never have stabbed Yugoslavia in the back after having concluded a pact of eternal friendship with her; (3) Hungary would not now be fighting on the side of her inveterate and most hated enemy, Germany, against Great Britain, for whom the Hungarians always entertained feelings of friendship and admiration as the classical home of constitution and freedom. In short, all the errors and crimes committed by the Horthy régime could have been prevented if Hungary had really had, what she did not have, 'a strictly parliamentary régime.'"

# ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION

by JOSEF MALÍK, Ing., Director of the National Bank of Czechoslovakia \*

## I. AN OUTLINE OF FUTURE REFORMS

### 1. Some Recriminations

The future world order is of great interest to all of us. As Europeans, however, we are particularly interested in the future of Europe, with which we are associated not only geographically, but mainly through historical and cultural traditions, to say nothing of other bonds, economic in particular, and common threats, chiefly from Prussian Germany! To-day it is perhaps clear even to the most obdurate isolationists in the West that Europe has to be the concern of all, and that both natural (Channel) and artificial (Maginot and Siegfried Lines) barriers or obstacles afford no absolute protection and security in the age of science, fully applied in the modern war.

If Europe is to attain a higher standard of living for all of its peoples as a condition of their spiritual progress, and social security as well, it is necessary to discard the egoism of the big and rich, which is the true cause not only of the imperialism or great powers, but also of the economic nation-

alism of the small and poor. The fatal error should not be made again. The error is, for Britain and France, to lose interest in Europe east of Germany, and leave it at the mercy of the common enemy of human freedom, human rights, and the property of others, i.e. Germany, recognising her claims to it and thus practically offering it to her! Therefore it will be imperative to watch in the first place the men who will be responsible for Europe. In any case, these men must be better prepared for this task than were Neville Chamberlain, Daladier, and their major or minor collaborators or their predecessors. At the same time, it is important to do away with secret diplomacy and its methods. . . .

### 2. Federation—a Vital Necessity

Collaboration between the European nations assumes a political settlement on the basis of federations, with the participation of the present enemies of the United Nations, i.e. Germany and her satellites. Only a federated Europe will be able to recover full freedom—both political and economic!

However, European federal unions are not imaginable without the reinstatement of democracy in all countries without exception. Democracy—not only political, but also economic and social. Democracy for all and not for some only. Democracy—living and dynamic—and not on paper alone. Democracy—working and helping—and not a usurped domination of some "irremovable" men or groups or representatives of vested interests, political, economic or hereditary.

\* Mr. Malík, eminent Czech financier, kindly put at our disposal one of the chapters of his book to be published shortly. We are printing it without avoiding controversial political ideas, such as the mutual future legal relations of the Czech and Slovak nations, incorporation of Austria and even Turkey in Central Federation, etc.



Democracy of deeds and order—and not of empty words and anarchy. Democracy, based on mutual confidence, truth, honesty and tolerance. Democracy believing in and acknowledging right and justice for all. In short: Democracy in its original form and meaning, not a monster of managed democracy, nor democracy on a national pattern, as *e.g.* English, American, French, Czechoslovak, etc. Democracy simply as the government of the people, by the people, for the people!

Democracy is the greatest safeguard of peace between nations. Democracy must, however, penetrate into all departments of our life and of our work and must therefore be freed from all undemocratic ballast and attributes which it has so far been dragging along for centuries. As the internal policy of nations and States must be penetrated by democracy, so must democracy penetrate also the foreign policy of nations and States and the international relations in general. To this end it will be necessary to democratise diplomacy on its human side and achieve the democratisation of the work and the methods of diplomats. . . .

Democracy as political freedom is not possible without economic freedom. Where there are no free peoples, there is also no free economy. This maxim implies, of course, freedom of property acquired through honest work and diligence. In totalitarian States the freedom of individuals is suppressed and where peoples are enslaved and subjected to the State, there is but economics of force, which has all the characteristics of State capitalism and which therefore involves all imaginable sorts of restrictions and serfdom. Without them the totalitarian régimes and States are simply impossible!

There is scope for several federations in the New Europe. One of them will certainly be Germany—in any case deprived of territories which she conquered by force—and another one, which will probably include Central and South-Eastern European countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece and Turkey—provided that the victors of the present war, the United Nations, would not occupy countries which are now at war with them either of their own accord (Magyars) or by compulsion (Rumanians and Bulgars?).

### 3. *An Outline of Future Reforms*

The Atlantic Charter sums up in Article 4 (access to the trade and raw materials of the world for all under equal conditions) in a few words all that is necessary to achieve for the welfare of mankind. Practical consequences resulting from the said Article are twofold: (1) problems of the world-exchange of goods, and (2) problems of international world-payments.

Without going into details, mainly technical, the following may be said with respect to problem 1:

(1) A world agreement in the matter of agricultural and industrial production appears feasible. This agreement would have to deal both with productive capacity and with consumption, and could simultaneously solve these questions: division of labour and specialisation of production, employment, markets, standard of living and price levels.

(2) The said world agreement, supplemented by additional agreements, would supplant commercial treaties. Commercial policy would be no longer practised from State to State, but would be a constant charge of a Standing World Congress for the exchange of goods.

(3) In view of an international agreement on the world trade (customs) duties would be abolished—some immediately, some in stages—because the protection, which was the true meaning of these tariffs, would be no longer necessary.

(4) The promotion of new business activities could obviously develop freely in new production branches only and, of course, in accordance with the most favourable natural conditions and resources.

(5) Transport problems should be solved in such a way that a uniform transport policy, concerning land, sea and air communications, would be operative.

(6) Foreign trade balances of the individual federations would have to be cleared within certain intervals (monthly, quarterly) unless the big and rich States (federations) would grant loans, which they will have to do anyhow for some time after the war. . . .

Problems concerning international payments may be dealt with as follows:

(1) Gold as an international medium of payment is probably played out, although it might retain its stable (intrinsic) value and therefore its monetary attributes. Most of the monetary gold is, however, held at present by the U.S., and its redistribution appears to be doubtful—as after the last war it was not possible to carry it out despite strenuous efforts.

(2) Currencies will probably not be based on gold—or at least not as strictly as it was required by currency laws in individual countries. They will surely be paper—fiduciary—currencies which, however, will not only retain their main attributes as money—measure of value and medium of payment—but will also serve human economy, which is their primary task in the modern world. Consequently, monetary policy will be influenced and determined mostly by its internal part—credit policy; while its external counterpart—foreign exchange policy—will be to a large extent made inoperative through acceptance of fixed parities, and its meaning will be probably reduced to accounting and statistical functions in connection with clearing.

(3) For purposes of foreign trade there would be either one or two or three—for the most—currencies that would be interrelated on a fixed basis and their fixed relation to national currencies in the individual countries (federations) would also be firmly established.

(4) Foreign exchange business would probably disappear altogether, due to the introduction of a multilateral clearing to be kept by each federation (country). Balances, favourable and unfavourable, would have to be reported on certain days to a Central Compensation Bureau which would operate a general clearance. This Bureau would also make suggestions in respect of unsettled balances—in accordance with the rules of its supervisory organ. This, of course, would be in close touch and co-operation with the World Congress for the exchange of goods.

(5) Each country (federation) would have its own National Bank, which would control the currency independently from the State authorities—and in accordance with the actual needs of national economy, and, of course, according to principles laid down for the National Banks by their supervisory organ (Federal Monetary Board) for each federation. Besides, there could also exist a World Monetary Board. . . .

(6) National finances would be administered by each country independently. International loans to cover deficits or even for investment purposes will probably cease or be greatly limited—unless they could be granted in the form of goods, either in conjunction with settlements mentioned under (4) or independently. . . .

## II. THE COUNTRIES BETWEEN GERMANY AND RUSSIA

### 1. *Common Danger from a Common Enemy*

There is no doubt that order in this part of Europe—at present under the domination of Nazis or Fascists—will have to be restored by the subjugated peoples themselves. They will, of course, be thankful for help and assistance from the U.S., from Great Britain, and perhaps also from Russia. The latter will, however, need herself considerable assistance to remove as soon as possible the traces of the war, waged with the greatest fury on a very large portion of her territory.

After this war it will be necessary to establish a long lasting peace, mainly for the benefit of those who do not violate peace or are almost incapable of aggression. One, two, or even three large nations are not enough to cope with it. All will have therefore to unite to protect civilisation and



themselves against brute force. They will have to nip in the bud subversive movements and organisations such as the Levente in Hungary, Ustaša, which was supported and bred by totalitarian States, and the terroristic leagues in Germany, which were the hatch of the Gestapo.

The nations of Central and South-Eastern Europe, which endure unspeakable moral and physical hardships from the German and other invaders, hardly need to be reminded who is their deadliest enemy. "*Drang nach Osten*" of the Imperial Germany, which did not succeed with the help of the former Austria-Hungary, will not be a success for Nazi Germany, which therefore will not attain her aim—world domination. But her third attempt at it could lead to success, if the threatened nations would again look passively at preparations for conquest and even facilitate such preparations by the attitude of their leaders and statesmen.

Bismarck's saying, "Whoever is master of Bohemia, is also master of the whole of Europe", must be for ever impressed upon the mind not only of the Czechs—who in their hour of deepest distress entirely forgot it—but also of all the European nations, and principally of those living between the Baltic and Aegean Seas, because these nations will always be threatened by the Germans. Self-preservation is, however, not possible without joint defence. This is therefore the first and most important of all commandments to be observed by peoples temporarily subjugated by Germany!

## 2. Ineffectiveness of Past Agreements

A defensive alliance is usually supplemented by a political alliance, or more strictly by pursuing a common policy. Such an alliance, aiming at the protection of common vital interests, usually looks on paper as binding and even solemn. This impression was conveyed both by the League of Nations and the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente, to say nothing of Locarno and the Briand-Kellogg Pact!

We are primarily interested in an instrument of peace. For twenty years spirited addresses and speeches were delivered—alternately in Praha, Beograd, Bucuresti and elsewhere—on the importance of the Little Entente for the preservation of peace in Central Europe; the soldiers, too, were flattering each other; Czechoslovakia was busily supplying on credit arms and equipment to her two allies—and simultaneously commercial and economic negotiations were meeting with ever-growing obstacles and misunderstanding among the three parties, this leading finally to the cooling-off of one-time very friendly relations, to mutual distrust and suspicions. In such a state of things the dishonest policies pursued by the Hungarian gentry and Bulgarian and other Germanophiles flourished; similarly prospered the Judas policy of Stojadinovic, who was eager to get bribes from all; and from bad to worse marched the personal policy of Colonel Beck, whom the Czechoslovak statesmen and soldiers indirectly encouraged with their lack of foresight and their prejudices. . . .

The Little Entente held together, but was inevitably doomed to failure like the other peace instruments of the last twenty years, because it lacked a real basis, which could have upheld it. Thought or ideology, may they be the best, are insufficient to uphold a treaty, if it does not contain the cement of practical common interest.

## 3. The Importance and Necessity of Union

The settlement of conditions in Central and South-Eastern Europe will have to go far beyond the limit reached in the past—by the ten States concerned: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece and Turkey. These countries must associate to stand up jointly against the common enemy and thus defend their political and national independence.

This "Categorical Imperative" of the future will have to sweep aside whatever artificial or historical misunderstandings, feuds, rancour, mistrust or fears there are between

these countries—due to various reasons, one of them being that some countries are perhaps more advanced in cultural, political and economic development than others. In the future these countries should cease to be a tool of the policy of balance of power of great powers.

This applies particularly to the Balkans, which have been a cross-roads of political influences of the Great Powers: Great Britain, France, Russia, the former Austria-Hungary, Germany, the Ottoman Empire and even Italy, trying to play the rôle of a Big Power! These bloodless diplomatic battles in which a sincere interest in small, half- or wholly-enslaved Balkan nations was but feigned, were of course nothing else but a continuous struggle for influence, supremacy, which was euphemistically described as a policy of balance of power. . . . In fact, it was a game played by the Big Ones among themselves, enveloped in courteous forms of the old diplomacy—but always to the detriment of small, oppressed nations which were said to need their protection. . . . Serbia knows best what this "protection" looked like and what it meant. . . .

However, the settlement in Central and South-Eastern Europe will have to remove, in the first place, all things which in the past separated these countries from each other and which consequently made them weak and vulnerable. An obvious preliminary is that the true representatives of some of the above-mentioned countries—who are fortunate to be free in friendly countries—should sit down to joint work, that they should throw away the distorted mentality and false conceptions, in which some of them still indulge, that they should turn their minds to realities, and that they should put off for ever prejudices and mistrust of each other. Thus they can lay strong foundations for future harmonious life and common spiritual and material prosperity—through a sincere and intense co-operation just now, in exile. Co-operation—deep and lasting, better than that established between them during the last war, which did not survive the early period of joy and enthusiasm of liberation which the First World War brought to small nations. . . .

In conclusion, I should like to quote from the recently published book by C. A. Macartney (*Problems of the Danube Basin*, Cambridge University Press, 1942), whose views are based on experience as a Vice-Consul in Vienna, and with the Intelligence Department of the League of Nations Union: "One certainty, at least, has emerged quite definitely from the history of the last twenty—or rather, of the last ninety-three years. This is, that any plan which hopes to succeed must consider the wishes and needs of the east European peoples as a whole, not only of a favoured part of them. Peoples linked together by ethnic affinity, common historical traditions or other shared interests may choose to enter into especially close association with each other on a footing of equality; but all national imperialisms, whether based on historic claims, ancient or modern, on the pretension to fill some special imperial rôle in eastern Europe, or on merits acquired in the present war, or any other, will lead to revolt and instability if they involve the maintenance or re-establishment of hierarchy of nations. The same principles of freedom and equality will need to be applied in the mutual relations of the smaller nations as the area as a whole demands in its relationship to the outer world. The eastern slopes of the Bohemian mountains, Vienna, even Silesia, perhaps even Trieste, may not belong to eastern Europe under our political definition thereof; but their inclusion would certainly strengthen it economically. The statesmen of the future will presumably have to weigh, to the best of their ability, the national against economic, perhaps also the strategic arguments for and against the inclusion of each of these in eastern Europe. Inside the unit also, the economic position is quite different from the national. An efficient economic organisation of eastern Europe would have to disregard ethnic frontiers altogether. It would have to start from the widest point of view, that of the needs of the unit as a whole, and the principle of *sum cuique* would mean, not that each national

(Continued at foot of page 15.)





Coal  
Brown Coal  
Iron Ore

Manganese  
+ Chrome  
x Antimone

Copper  
Aluminium  
\* Mercury

O Zinc  
Zinc with Lead  
● Lead

▲ Rock Salt  
▲ Potassium Salt  
▲ Pyrites

Crude Oil  
Natural Gas



# THE MINERAL WEALTH OF CENTRAL EUROPE

by A. PLUTYŃSKI.

## COAL, OIL AND NATURAL GAS

The mineral wealth of any area is a vital element of its ability for self-defence, provided it is efficiently exploited by industry.

As to Central Europe—that is, the area between the Baltic, the Adriatic, the Aegean and the Black Sea—its defence potential is in some respects superior to that of Germany. In the period before the present war the number of boys born annually in that area was double the number of those born in Germany, while the combined agricultural production of the Central European countries was far larger than that of Germany. The German industry, on the other hand, was much stronger than the industry of the Central European area.

An assessment of the mineral resources of Central Europe may help us to find out whether the industry of the Central Federation may ever hope to equal or overtake the industry of the Reich.

A comparison between Germany and Central Europe in respect of mineral wealth is bound to be only approximate. Germany is one of the few areas in the world that have been thoroughly investigated from the geological point of view. This is due to the work done by various universities and the Geological Institute, as well as to the coal and potassium prospectors of 1900-1905. In order to encourage prospecting, the Reichstag voted a law under which all mineral wealth was made the property of the State, unless it was discovered by the owner of the land himself.

One of the consequences of the vote of this law was the establishment of two great mining concerns: the "Deutsche Tiefbohr-gesellschaft" of Nördhausen and the "Internationale Tiefbohr-gesellschaft" of Erkelenz, which undertook borings all over the territory of the Reich, from Alsace to the Russian border, acting as contractors for claim owners. Any minerals discovered in this manner were analysed by the Mines Department and the claim owners eventually acquired formal property deeds in respect of the deposits on their land. Apart from these private borings, the Prussian Government carried out a large scale prospecting activity on its own account and some of the shafts reached considerable depth. The 2300 metres shaft of Paruszwice in Silesia held the world record for a long time.

In consequence, at least 80 per cent. of the territory of Germany has been thoroughly investigated and it can be reasonably assumed that a corresponding proportion of the mineral wealth of the country had been officially listed and is exploited.

Unlike Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Turkey—which had been controlling the territory of Central Europe until 1914-1918—neglected their mineral resources.

(Continued from page 13.)

unit, or even each geographical one, produced the same things, but rather that each produced the things which it was best fitted to produce, fulfilling a special rôle within and for the benefit of the whole. Finally, the economic position *vis-a-vis* the outer world is also different from the national-political. Nationally, eastern Europe needs complete freedom from the national imperialism of its neighbours. Economically, eastern Europe needs independence in the sense of protection from exploitation, but it could not achieve, and would not be benefited by, autarchy. It would still give and receive benefits by trading with the outer world, and especially with Germany and Italy. It would take separately each of the great needs of security, national freedom and economic welfare, in each case working within the appropriate limits and through the appropriate organisation. The forms which it evolved would probably be something which the world has not yet seen; but then, the world has not yet seen eastern Europe organised as its special conditions require."

The independent countries established in Central Europe in 1919 were too poor to organise large-scale geological research, and in any case twenty years is a short time in which to carry out such a task over a vast area. The area of Central Europe is three times larger than that of the Reich and only some parts of it have been systematically investigated by geologists. In Poland, for instance, only Silesia, the region of salt mines near Inowrocław and the oil zone in the Carpathians have been investigated. This is only 20 per cent. of the total area of the country. The rest remains unknown, except for quite shallow drillings.

In Rumania geological investigation has been also confined almost exclusively to the oil region, while the mining of metal ores in Transylvania has been carried on by antiquated methods. In the Balkans the exploitation of mineral resources began no more than ten years ago, even in localities where the deposits were practically on the surface.

A comparison of the mineral wealth of Germany and of Central Europe is therefore bound to be incomplete. We shall be comparing the known resources of the two regions, but we should bear in mind that, in the case of Central Europe, no more than a third of the territory has been prospected at all, while Germany is almost certain to have no undiscovered mineral resources of any importance.

## COAL

Before the present war the German Reich was the second largest producer of coal in Europe, next to Great Britain. Germany was also the second largest exporter.

In 1937 Germany together with Austria produced 185 million tons of coal, while the total production of Central Europe was 55 million tons. Germany produced, moreover, 188 million tons of brown coal, while Central Europe had an output of only 34½ million tons of brown coal.

The disparity in the coal production of the two areas under review was due mainly to their different degree of industrial development, but did not correspond to the relative size of the already discovered coal deposits. The coal reserves of Germany (including the coal of the Polish districts of Silesia which had been incorporated to Germany) are estimated (according to Hubner of Vienna) at 181 milliards of tons. The same authority estimated the Polish reserves of coal at 158 milliard tons and the Czechoslovakian at 25 milliards.

M. Książkiewicz (*West-Slavonic Bulletin*, No. 6, p. 14) estimates the reserve of coal in the Polish part of the Silesian Basin, taking account only of deposits down to 1000 metres and disregarding layers of less than 1 metre thickness in the upper and ½ metre in the lower sections, at 61,781 milliard tons. These figures characterise, in terms of present-day methods of exploitation, the possibilities of one of the Polish coalfields that are already known.

The technical and labour conditions of coal extraction are better in Silesia than anywhere else in Europe. The average production of coal per day and per man was in Poland 1.8 tons, in Germany and Czechoslovakia 1.5 tons, in Great Britain 1.2 tons and in France 0.9 tons. This record was established, thanks to the favourable position and good quality of the coal deposits and the skill of the miners. The technical equipment of the Silesian collieries is modern, though not equal to American standards. During the present war, the Germans increased the output easily to 100 million tons, without sinking any new shafts.

Silesia, including the region of Ostrawa-Karwina, which supplies excellent coke coal, could therefore provide the whole of Central Europe with coal for industrial, transport and domestic purposes. The southern part of the Central European area is short of good quality coal suitable for transport. According to the Royal Institute of International Affairs ("South-Eastern Europe," p. 96) the total coal production of Hungary, Rumania and the Balkan countries amounted in 1937 to 7,247,000 tons and in 1938 to 7,807,000 tons.

The solution of the coal problem in the Central Federation would be assisted by the following measures:

(1) The whole area to be supplied with Polish and Czech coal, except for districts in the vicinity of local lignite mines.



(2) Second-rate coal to be used locally for the production of electric power distributed to industry by a grid system.

(3) The export of Polish coal to overseas countries to be limited to cases where it is necessary as an exchange for imported iron-ore (from Sweden) or scrap.

(4) Greece and Yugoslavia to be supplied with British coal, in exchange for bauxite and cereals; sea transport will be cheaper than rail.

In the interests of transport economy, the coal supplied by the north to the south would be of the highest quality (6000-7600 continental calories). Other coal would be used locally.

## OIL AND NATURAL GAS

Germany has only a few minor oilfields in the regions of Halle and Hanover. They are exploited irrespective of cost, in some cases by the uneconomical method of underground galleries instead of pumping shafts. The annual production is in the neighbourhood of 500,000 tons.

The Polish oilfields had been the first in the world to be commercially exploited, when Lukaszewicz, a Polish chemist, designed in 1853 the first paraffin lamp. Later, Szczepanowski discovered the oilfields of Sloboda Rungurska, Schodnica and Bitkow, while MacGarvey was the pioneer of Boryslaw and Tustanowice, a primary oilfield resembling Baku. In 1908 and 1909 Poland had reached the climax of her production—2,000,000 tons per year. As no new oilfields have been discovered since 1903, the production eventually dwindled to 500,000, and it remained at that level throughout the recent years.

Following the American example, the Polish engineers use the natural earth gas, which formerly was allowed to escape. The annual production of gasoline from gas was 40,000 tons. Besides the gas found in oilfields, large deposits of gas have been discovered in a two hundred miles long zone along the Carpathians. These reserves have been partly tapped, and in spite of the fact that the installations for capturing the gas and conveying it by pipeline were not adequate, the annual production of natural gas in Poland amounted in 1937 to 531 million cubic metres. Some of the shafts were stopped and held over for future use.

The presence of such large quantities of gas under such a large area of the sub-Carpathian region suggests that there may be undiscovered oil in the Carpathians. It has been found that gas and oil appear usually together, and American experience proved

that oil was likely to be found lower down where there was gas near the surface. The deepest of the Polish oil wells are 1750 metres, while in America there are 4500 metres borings.

The Polish natural gas (except in oil wells) is of the dry type, composed of about 95 per cent. of methane. Gas from deeper shafts contains, however, also butane, pentane and other gases. This suggests that the deeper gas pockets contain gas suitable for the production of gasoline.

The natural gas itself is a high-grade fuel. Its caloric value (9600 continental calories) is twice that of artificial lighting gas. The numerous industrial uses of natural gas are well known in America, but in Europe its possibilities have not yet been fully exploited.

The growth of the Rumanian oil industry was similar to that of the Polish one. The first wells were bored in the mountains (Campina Baicoi, etc.) and did not yield much oil. Later, large oilfields were discovered near Ploesti, in relatively flatter country. Financed by American, British-Dutch and French capital, the Rumanian oil industry grew rapidly and its production reached in 1936 its summit output of 8,703,000 tons. Since that time, however, the output of the older Rumanian wells has been declining and it seems likely that the present production is in the neighbourhood of 6,000,000 tons. The political conditions before the war did not favour the investment of large sums in speculative borings.

The total oil production of the Central European area—Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Albania—amounts to about 7,000,000 tons—that is, fourteen times more than the oil production of Germany.

The presence of large quantities of natural gas has been discovered in Rumania both east of the Carpathians, at Jassy, and within the Carpathian semicircle, east of Cluj. Only one-third of the estimated possible output of two milliard cubic metres has been exploited. This suggests that there may be oil not only within the Carpathian region, but also elsewhere in Rumania. Deep drilling of the American type might reveal new oilfields of great wealth.

The Germans may try to compensate their inferiority to Central Europe in oil production by producing large quantities of alcohol, benzole and artificial petrol. Every ton of artificial petrol requires, however, several tons of coal. The production of large quantities of artificial fuel would therefore put a heavy strain on the coal industry, and Germany, with her low birth rate, cannot find sufficient manpower for doubling and trebling her output of coal. Central Europe—assuming that area to be united—would therefore have a marked superiority over Germany in respect of liquid fuel.

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